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Abstract
In this paper we establish a link between the volatility of oil price shocks and a positive
expected value of inﬂation in equilibrium (inﬂation premium). In doing so, we implement
the perturbation method to solve up to second order a benchmark New Keynesian model
with oil price shocks. In contrast with log linear approximations, the second order solution
relaxes certainty equivalence providing a link between the volatility of shocks and inﬂation
premium. First, we obtain analytical results for the determinants of the level of inﬂation
premium.T h u s , w e ﬁnd that the degree of convexity of both the marginal cost and the
phillips curve is a key element in accounting for the existence of a positive inﬂation pre-
mium. We further show that the level of inﬂation premium might be potentially large even
when a central bank implements an active monetary policy. Second, we evaluate numeri-
cally the second order solution of the model to explain the episode of high and persistent
inﬂation observed in the US during the 70’s. We ﬁnd, in contrast with Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (QJE, 2000), that even when there is no diﬀerence in the monetary policy rules be-
tween the pre-Volcker and post-Volcker periods, oil price shocks can generate high inﬂation
levels during the 70’s through a positive high level of inﬂation premium. As by product,
our analysis shows that oil price shocks along with a distorted steady state can generate
a time-varying endogenous trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and deviations of output from its
eﬃcient level. The previous trade-oﬀ, once uncertainty is taking into account, implies that
a positive level of inﬂation premium is an optimal response to oil price shocks.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E42, E12, C63
Keywords: Phillips Curve, Second Order Solution, Oil Price Shocks, Endogenous
Trade-oﬀ.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In an inﬂuential paper, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000, hereafter CGG), have advanced the
idea that the reduction of inﬂation in the US during the past two decades was explained mainly
by the improvement in monetary policy and instead oil price shocks have played a minor role.
CGG based their conclusions on the estimations of monetary policy reaction functions for two
periods: pre and post Volcker1. Their estimations show that during the 70s the FED, on
average, let the real short term interest rate to decline as anticipate inﬂation rose, whereas
during the post Volcker period the monetary policy of the FED became more active, raising
the real interest rate in response to an increase on inﬂation expectations. Similar evidence is
found by Cogley and Sargent (2002) and Lubik and Schorfhedie (2004).
However, these results are in contrast with recent contributions by Sims and Zha (2005,
SZ hereafter), Canova, Gambetti and Pappa (2005), Primiceri (2004), Gordon (2005) and
Leeper and Zha (2003) who ﬁnd no evidence of a substantial change in the reaction function of
monetary policy after Volcker period2. Instead they ﬁnd strong evidence of a sizable reduction
of the volatility of the main business cycle driven forces across these two periods. The previous
authors emphasize on the role of second moments of shocks in identifying changes in monetary
policy regime and the consequent inﬂation dynamics. In particular, SZ pointed out that the
fact that previous works did not allow for heteroskedasticity have biased their results towards
ﬁnding signiﬁcant shifts in coeﬃcients in the monetary policy rule.
The discussion of whether monetary policy or oil price shocks was the main driving force
of inﬂation dynamics goes vis-a-vis with the debate about the recessionary eﬀects of either
monetary shock or oil price shocks. For example, Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) argue
that monetary policy has played a larger role during 70´s in explaining the negative output
dynamics. In particular, if the monetary policy would not have reacted that much during
that period the negative eﬀects over output could have been mitigated. On the other hand,
Hamilton (2001) and Hamilton and Herrada (2004) ﬁnd out that the previous authors results
rely on a particular identiﬁcation scheme, and on the contrary they ﬁnd that a contractionary
monetary policy played only a minor role on the contractions in real output, being oil prices
t h em a i ns o u r c eo fs h o c k 3.
CGG (2000) downweight the role of oil price shocks on the grounds that changes in oil
prices can only generate temporary increases in the price level but not persistent increases in
inﬂation. They argue that supply shocks in order to generate persistent increases in inﬂation
should be accompanied by a accommodative monetary policy rule. However, as it was pointed
out by SZ (2005) the importance of shocks in explaining the dynamics of inﬂation relies to a
great extent on taking into account the second moments of shocks. Therefore, standard log-
linear approximations of general equilibrium models are not suitable to analyze the interaction
between monetary policy and second moment of shocks. For instance, CGG use a linear
1I tr e f e st ot h ea p p o i n t m e n to fP a u lV o l c k e ras Chairman of the Federal Reserve System.
2Orphanides (2001) shows that when real time data are used to estimate policy reaction functions, the
evidence of a change in policy after 1980 is weak.
3Hamilton (2001), ﬁnds that the size of the eﬀect that Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) attribute to oil
shocks is substantially smaller than that reported by other researchers, primarily due to their choice of a shorter
l a gl e n g t ht h a nu s e db yo t h e rr e s e a r c h e r s .
2model where certainty equivalence holds and, therefore, the potential interaction between the
volatility of shocks and average level of inﬂation is neglected.
In this paper we try to reconcile these two streams of the literature in a tractable and uniﬁed
framework. In particular, we propose a set up that generates a link between the volatility of
oil price shocks and average level of inﬂation. Thus, we show that a standard New keynesian
model, in which oil price shocks is the only source of ﬂuctuations and enters as non-produced
input in production, is capable to generate high persistent levels of inﬂation in response to oil
shocks. Although the model is very similar to the one analyzed by CGG, the main diﬀerence is
that we use a second-order solution for the rational expectations equilibrium, instead of a linear
one. The second order solution, by relaxing certainty equivalence, generates a link between the
volatility of shocks and the average level of inﬂation. This link permit the model to deliver an
extra higher level of inﬂation compared to the level of inﬂation obtained in a log-linear model.
We deﬁne this extra level of average inﬂation as the level of inﬂation premium4.
We implement, both analytically and numerically, the second-order solution by using the
Perturbation method in the line of Sims (2002), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and Kim
and Kim (2005). We propose a novel strategy in implementing the perturbation method to
obtain analytical solution for the level of inﬂation premium in equilibrium. Diﬀerent from
other paper in which the perturbation method is applied directly to the non-linear system of
equations, we instead ﬁrst approximate the model up to second order and then we apply the
perturbation method to the approximated model. This strategy permit us to disentangle the
key determinants of the inﬂation premium in equilibrium.
Our analytical ﬁndings provide a link between the volatility of oil price shocks and the level
of inﬂation premium. The mechanism through which this linki se s t a b l i s h e dw o r k sa sf o l l o w s :
ﬁrst, since oil is used as an input in production, the volatility of oil prices aﬀects expected
marginal cost of ﬁrms. When the marginal cost function is convex in oil prices, expected
marginal costs are increasing in the volatility of this shock inducing forward looking ﬁrms to
charge higher prices optimally. We show that the necessary condition for a convex marginal
cost is an elasticity of substitution between oil and labor smaller than one. Furthermore, the
smaller the elasticity of substitution, the larger the convexity of the marginal cost function
and consequently the larger the level of inﬂation premium. A second channel through which
oil prices aﬀect inﬂation is by the convexity of Phillips curve with respect to output5.T ot h e
extent that the Phillips curve is convex on output, higher volatility on output generated by oil
price shocks delivers a positive premium in inﬂation6. And third, we show that the overall level
of inﬂation premium in equilibrium depends crucially on the relative weight that the central
bank puts on output with respect to inﬂation. In particular, the larger the weight on output
ﬂuctuations in the reaction function of the central bank (Taylor rule) the larger the level of
inﬂation premium.
4The extra level of inﬂation generated by volatility is similar to the eﬀect of consumption volatility on the
level of average savings as in the literature of precautionary savings.
5Weise (1999) ﬁnds some evidence that indicates that the Phillips curve by the U.S might be convex. He
ﬁnds that inﬂa t i o ni sm o r er e s p o n s i v et od e m a n ds h o c k sw h e ne c o n o m yi si nab o o mt h a nw h e ni ti si nr e c e s s i o n .
6Castillo and Montoro (2005) explain in detail the determinants of the convexity of the new phillips curve
under Calvo price-setting. They show that the convexity of the Phillips curve is cruciall in generating asymmetric
responses of output to demand shocks.
3For the numerical exercises we calibrate the model for the U.S. economy by considering
that oil prices shocks has exhibited a change in its mean and volatility across the pre and post
Volcker periods. Our results shows that oil prices are able to generate, through high levels of
inﬂation premium, the persistent increase in the level of inﬂation observed during the 70s even
when an active monetary policy is in place. Furthermore, we perform a counterfactual exercise
by ﬁtting the historical values of oil prices shocks into the model by considering an active
Taylor rule for the whole sample. We ﬁnd that the model can track fairly well the average
values of inﬂation during the 70s. Hence, our paper provides support to the empirical ﬁndings
of SZ (2005) that second moments of shocks might be important to understand the change in
macroeconomic behavior observed in the US economy without relying in an accommodative
monetary policy.
Additionally, we also perform robustness analysis by considering alternative speciﬁcations
of the model. In particular we introduce real rigidities as in Blanchard and Gali (2005 hereafter,
BG) and we ﬁnd that these rigidities reduce the level of inﬂation premium. The main intuition
of this results is as follows: real rigidities tend to smooth marginal costs since today’s real wage
depends of the previous period wage rate. Smoother marginal costs reduce the uncertainty
that price setters face, therefore inducing them to set prices charging a lower premium. We
also include demand shocks to the model and the quantitative results do not change much, in
fact, demand shocks marginally increase the level of inﬂation premium.
Last but no least, we explore the implications of the level of inﬂation premium for the
design of monetary policy. We show that inﬂation premium m i g h te m e r g ea sa no p t i m a l
response of the central bank to supply shocks. In particular, unlike BG, we ﬁnd that when we
allow for a distorted steady-state and the production function exhibits a constant elasticity of
substitution, oil prices generate a meaningful endogenous trade-oﬀ between the stabilization
of inﬂation and output gap.7 This trade-oﬀ implies that is optimal for the central bank to
partially react to oil price shocks and to allow on average higher levels of inﬂation8. In fact,
the trade-oﬀ would imply that the behavior of inﬂation during the 70s might reﬂect not only
a perfectly consistent monetary policy but an optimal one.
Finally, other authors have introduced the second order approach in closed and open
economies, however, most of the work have mainly focused on welfare evaluations across dif-
ferent environments or stochastic processes but none of them have dealt with the implications
of second order solution for the determination of the inﬂation premium. Thus, Benigno and
Woodford (2004) implement the second order solution to evaluate optimal monetary and ﬁscal
policy in a closed economy. Benigno and Benigno (2005) have used the second order approach
to evaluate the optimal policy in a two-country model with complete markets9.C l o s e rt oo u r
work are the recent papers by Evans and Hnatkovska (2005) and Castillo and Montoro (2005).
7These authors ﬁnd that with a Coob-Douglas production function supply shocks do not generate a trade-oﬀ
between the stabilization of inﬂation and output gap. In order to generate the trade-oﬀ, BG rely on some
reduced form of real rigidities in the labor market.
8Benigno and Woodford (2005) have shown that even under a distorted steady state it is possible to ﬁnd an
accurate welfare measure in terms of output ﬂuctuations with respect to an eﬃcient level of output. Therefore,
a meaningful trade-oﬀ arises once a well deﬁned measure of eﬃcient level is considered.
9Also, Ferrero (2005) extends Beningo and Woodford (2004) to a two country open economy model. In a
similar direction, De Paoli (2004) evaluates welfare for the case of a small open economy model with home bias.
4The ﬁrst authors evaluate the role of uncertainty in explaining diﬀerences in asset holdings in a
two-country model. The latter authors build up a model with non-homothetic preferences and
show how asymmetric responses of output and inﬂation emerges from the interaction of a con-
vex Phillips curve and a state dependent elasticity of substitution in a standard New keynesian
model. On the other hand, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998) develop an explicit stochastic NOEM
model relaxing the assumption of certainty equivalence. Based on simpliﬁed assumptions, they
obtain analytical solutions for the level exchange rate premium. Diﬀerent from Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (1998) and the aforementioned authors in this paper we perform both a quantitative
and analytical evaluation of the second order approximation of the New Keynesian benchmark
economy in order to account for the level of inﬂation premium generated by oil price shocks.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts for the US
economy, in particular we focus on the mean level of inﬂation for diﬀerent subperiods. In
section 3 we outline a benchmark New Keynesian model augmented with oil as a non produced
input. Section 4 explains the mechanism at work in generating the level of inﬂation premium.
In section 5 we report the numerical results. In section 6 we discuss the implications of the
second order solution for monetary policy and ﬁnally in the last section we conclude.
2 Oil Shocks and the US economy
In the paper we focus on the role of oil shocks at driving the mean and volatility in inﬂation in
the U.S. economy. Our hypothesis points out to the fact that changes in the data generating
process in oil shocks, basically, changes in the mean and volatility of these shocks, can account
for diﬀerences in inﬂation mean levels in the U.S. economy in two well known periods (see
CGG 2000)10. We would like to highlight the role of change in volatility of oil prices as adding
uncertainty in inﬂation and consequently higher means. Thus, in this section we report some
unconditional moments, in particular, mean and standard deviations for the following variables:
inﬂation, GDP gap11, the three months T-bill and oil prices. The data are quarterly time series
spanning 1970:1-2005:2. In order to calculate the moments we divide the 1970:1-2000:4 sample
in two main subperiods: 1970:01 -1987:2, which corresponds to the Pre-Volcker period. The
second period 1987:3-2000:4 corresponds to the Alan Greenspan´s one. Importantly, these sub-
periods are similar to the ones considered by CGG (2000) as a evidence of change in monetary
policy in U.S. CGG associate the ﬁrst period to one in which the central bank has adopted an
accommodative policy and the second one in which the central bank responds more actively
to expected inﬂation.
We obtain the data from the Haver USECON database (mnemonics are in parentheses).
Our measure of the price level is the nofarm business sector deﬂator (LXNFI), the measure
of GDP corresponds to the nonfarm business sector output (LXNFO), we use the quarterly
average daily of the 3-month T-bill (FTB3) as the nominal interest rate, and ﬁnally our measure
of oil prices is the Spot Oil Prices West Texas Intermediate (PZTEXP). We express output in
percapita terms by dividing LXNFO by a measure of civilian noninstitutional population aged
10We interpret the mean level of inﬂation within each period as the level inﬂation premium.
11We measure GDP gap as the deviation of the log of output from a linear trend. We do this in order to be
consistent with the deﬁnition of output used in the model.
5above 16 (LNN) and oil prices are deﬂated by the nofarm business sector deﬂator.
In Figure 1 we plot the real oil prices against quarterly annualized inﬂation for the period
1970:1-2005:2. In the ﬁrst sub-sample we observe a persistent initial increase in inﬂation vis-a-
vis and increase in oil prices following the oil price shock in 1974. From 1980 on we observe a
steadily decline in inﬂation accompanied by a persistent drop in oil prices. For the second sub-
sample, we observe also a close co-movement between inﬂation and oil prices, thus from early
nineties until 1999 it is observed a downward trend in both oil prices and inﬂation, whereas
from 2000 on we observe a markedly upward trend in oil and a moderate increase in inﬂation.
During the ﬁrst sub-sample oil prices present larger and more persistent swings with respect
to the second sub-sample. Thus, in the ﬁrst period oil prices exhibit high both volatility and
mean whereas in the second period the aforementioned moments have decreased signiﬁcantly.
The previous observation is conﬁrmed by the statistics in Table 1. The standard deviation
of real oil prices has decreased in half, from 0.57 to 0.20, similarly the mean in oil prices has































Figure1 Inﬂation and oil prices
Now we turn to analyze which might be the empirical implications of the change in volatil-
ity and mean in the oil price. Notice that by comparing the sub-samples we observe an
important change in means and volatilities in inﬂation, GDP gap, and interest rates across
sub-samples. Quarterly inﬂation standard deviation has decreased from 0.8% to 0.3% and
the mean has moved from 1.4% to 0.5%, between the pre-Volcker and post-Volcker periods,
6respectively. Similarly, the three-month T-bill has decreased in both means and volatilities.
Finally, GDP gap has decreased in volatility (from a standard deviation of 4.3% to 2.8%) and
has experimented and increase in its mean (from -0.36% to -0.22%).
Table 1: Unconditional Moments
Mean Standard Deviation
Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker
Inﬂation 1.38 0.53 0.80 0.29
GDP −0.36 −0.22 4.32 .8
T-Bills 1.91 1.34 0.71 0.36
Oil Prices 0.286 0.198 0.57 0.20
Pre-Volcker and post-volcker correspond to the period 70:1-87-:2 and 87:3-2000:4
In a nutshell, it seems that the change in oil prices dynamics have had a key eﬀect over
the mean of the main macroeconomic variables in U.S. from 70´s on. The numbers presented
here are consistent with our story, which emphasizes in the change in inﬂation premium and
uncertainty coming from oil prices as the main driving forces in explaining the level of inﬂation
premium in the U.S. In the next section we present a microfoundated model able to establish
the link between volatility and average inﬂation.
3 A New keynesian model with oil prices
The model economy corresponds to the standard New Keynesian Model in the line of CGG
(2000). In order to capture oil shocks we follow BG (2005) by introducing a non-produced
input M, represented in this case by oil. Q will be the real price of oil which is assumed to be
exogenous.
3.1 Households










where σ represents the coeﬃcient of risk aversion and ν captures the inverse of the elasticity of
labor supply. The optimizer consumer takes decisions subject to a standard budget constraint



















where Wt is the nominal wage, Pt is the price of the consumption good, Bt is the end of
period nominal bond holdings, Rt is the nominal gross interest rate , Γt is the share of the
7representative household on total nominal proﬁts, and Tt are transfers from the government12.
















t = MRSt (4)
Equation (3) is the standard Euler equation that determines the optimal path of consumption.
At the optimum the representative consumer is indiﬀerent between consuming today or tomor-
row, whereas equation (4) describes the optimal labor supply decision. We assume that labor
markets are competitive and also that individuals work in each sector z ∈ [0,1].T h e r e f o r e ,L






3.2.1 Final Good Producers
There is a continuum of ﬁnal good producers of mass one, indexed by f ∈ [0,1] that operate
in an environment of perfect competition. They use intermediate goods as inputs, indexed by












where ε is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. Then the demand function
























12In the model we assume that the government owns the oil endowment. Oil is produced in the economy at
zero cost and sold to the ﬁrms at an exogenous price Qt. The government transfers all the revenues generated
by oil to consumers represented by Tt
83.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers












where M is oil which enters as a non-produced input,ψrepresents the intratemporal elasticity
of substitution between labor-input and oil and α denotes the share of oil in the production
function. We use this generic production function in order to capture the fact that oil has few
substitutes13,i . eψ<1.T h eo i lp r i c es h o c k ,Qt, is assumed to follow an AR(1) process in logs,
logQt =l o gQ + ρlogQt−1 + εt (11)
Where Q is the steady state oil price. From the cost minimization problem of the ﬁrm we














where MCt (z) represents the real marginal cost, Wt nominal wages and Pt the consumer price
index. Notice that marginal costs are the same for all intermediate ﬁrms, since technology has
constant return to scale and factor markets are competitive, i.e. MCt (z)=MCt.O n t h e










Intermediate producers set prices following a staggered pricing mechanism a la Calvo. Each
ﬁrm faces an exogenous probability of changing prices given by (1 − θ). The optimal price that























where µ = ε





is the stochastic discount factor,
P∗
t (z) is the optimal price level chosen by the ﬁrm, Ft+k =
Pt+k
Pt the cumulative level of
13Notice that when ψ =1 , the production function colapses to the standadard cobb-douglas function as the




9inﬂation and Yt+k is the aggregate level of output. The optimal price solves equation (14) and


























Since only a fraction (1 − θ) of ﬁrms changes prices every period and the remaining one keeps
its price ﬁxed, the aggregate price level, the price of the ﬁnal good that minimize the cost of
the ﬁnal goods producers, is given by the following equation:
P1−ε
t = θP1−ε
t−1 +( 1− θ)(P∗
t (z))
1−ε (17)
Following Benigno and Woodford (2005), equations (14) and (17) can be written recursively
introducing the auxiliary variables Nt and Dt :
θ(Πt)













Nt = µYt (Ct)
−σ MCt + θβEt [(Πt+1)
  Nt+1] (20)
Equation (18) comes from the aggregation of individual ﬁrms prices. The ratio Nt/Dt repre-
sents the optimal relative price P∗
t (z)/Pt. These three last equations summarize the recursive
representation of the non linear Phillips curve.15
14In order to write the optimal price in a recursive form, we use the following change of variables following



























15Writing the optimal price setting in a recursive way is necessary in order to implement numerically or
algebraically the perturbation method.
103.3 Monetary Policy














The steady state values are expressed without time subscript and with and upper bar.
3.4 Market Clearing
In equilibrium labor, intermediate and ﬁnal goods markets clear. Since there is no capital
accumulation nor government sector, the economywide resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct (22)




Where the demand for labor comes from the aggregation of individual intermediate producers





























dz is a measure of price dispersion. Since relative prices diﬀer across
ﬁrms due to staggered price setting, input usage will diﬀer as well, implying that is not possible
to use the usual representative ﬁrm assumption and it will appears this price dispersion term
in the aggregate labor demand.
4I n ﬂationary Premium and Oil Price Shocks: The Mechanism
4.1 The second order solution and the inﬂation premium
In order to explain the determinants of the level of inﬂation premium we rely on a second order
log approximation solution of the model. The second order solution delivers a link between
volatility of price shocks and the means of endogenous variables16. As we mentioned in the
introduction we deﬁne level of inﬂation premium as the extra level of inﬂation that arises in
equilibrium once the second order solution is considered.17
16The model also delivers a premium in other endogenous variables, however, we focus on inﬂation.
17It is important to remark that this extra level of average inﬂation is part of the dynamic rational expectations
equilibrium up to second order, and it can not be interpreted as a part of the steady state equilibrium. This
second order eﬀect on the level inﬂation is similar to the eﬀect of the volatility of consumption on savings that
is known in the literature as precautionary savings.
11We follow the perturbation method implemented by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) (S-
GU, hereafter)18. This method permit us to solve the model algebraically and obtain closed
form solution for the equilibrium level of inﬂation. Up to second order inﬂation in equilibrium






















terms on q and σq of order equal or higher than 3.19.N o t i c et h a tt h et e r mb1qt corresponds
to the policy function that we would obtain using any standard method for linear models





2 account for the level of uncertainty (premium)20.T h i se x t r al e v e lo fi n ﬂation has two
components: 1
2boσ2
q, which is constant and, 1
2b2 (qt)
2 which is time varying. We further express
the dynamics of oil prices as:
qt = ρqt−1 + ησqet (26)
where the oil shock has been normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one,
i.e. et iid ˜( 0 ,1). We set η =
p
1 − ρ2 in order to express V (qt)=σ2
q.G i v e n t h ep r e v i o u s
policy functions the unconditional expected level of inﬂation is diﬀerent from zero and positive






In order to ﬁnd the determinants of the level inﬂation premium, in the next section we use
the algebraic solution of the perturbation method to express bo and b2 as functions of the deep
parameters of the model.
4.2 Second order expansion of the model
Diﬀerent from other papers which apply perturbation methods directly to the non-linear sys-
tem of equations, we ﬁrst approximate the model up to second order and then apply the
perturbation method21. Our proposed approach has the advantage that makes easier to obtain
clear analytical interpretation of the sources of the level of inﬂation premium.
18The perturbation method was originally develop by Judd (1998) and Collard and Julliard (2001). The
ﬁxed point algorithm proposed by Collard and Julliard (2001) introduces a dependence of the coeﬃcients of the
linear and quadratic terms of the solution with the volatility of the shocks. In contrast, the advantage of the
algorithm proposed by S-GU is that the coeﬃcients of the policy are invariant to the volatility of the shocks
and the corresponding ones to the linear part of the solution are the same as those obtained solving a log linear
approximated model, which makes both techniques comparable.
19Smith-Grohe and Uribe (2004) show that the quadratic solution does not depend neither on σq nor on qtσq
i.e. they show that the coeﬃcients in the solution for those terms are zero.
20Notice that these additional components also imply that the impulse response functions of inﬂation is
asymmetric.
21Since a second order taylor expansion is an exact approximation up to second order of any non-linear
equation, having the system expressed in that way would give the same solution as the system in its non-linear
form.
12Up to second order the model can be written as a system of two equations, the aggregate
demand and the aggregate supply side. A detailed derivation is provided in Appendix B.
We denote variables in steady state with over bars (i.e. X) and the log deviations around the
steady state with lower case letters (i.e. x). The second order approximation of the aggregate
supply can be written as follows22:
vt = κmct +
1
2










w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned the following auxiliary variable:












(1 − θβ)πtzt (29)
vt is an auxiliary variable that simpliﬁes the second order expansion of the Phillips curve.
The coeﬃcient κ measures the standard linear eﬀect of the marginal costs on inﬂation κ =
1−θ
θ (1 − θβ). On the other hand, zt is a recursive auxiliary variable that comes from approx-
imating the equations of the auxiliary variables Nt and Dt and has the following ﬁrst order
expansion












We further can express the real marginal costs equation as the following second order equation
on output and oil prices23:
mct = χ(ν + σ)yt +( 1− χ)qt + χvb ∆t +
1
2
(1 − χ)χ2 1 − ψ















we deﬁne αF as the share of oil in the marginal costs and χ is a parameter that measures
the impact of oil shocks over the marginal cost. b ∆t is the log-deviation of the price dispersion
measure ∆t, which is a second order function of inﬂation (see appendix B3 for details). It
is important to note that even though the share of oil in the production function, α, can be
small, its impact on marginal cost,αF, can be magniﬁed when oil has few substitutes (i.e. ψ is
low, in general ψ<1) 24. Also, a permanent increase in oil prices, i.e. an increase in Q,w o u l d
make marginal cost of ﬁrms more sensitive to oil price shocks since it increases αF .I n t h e
22We follow Benigno and Woodford (2005) strategy when writting the AS as a second order approximation.
23The marginal costs can also be expressed as a function of the output gap: xt = yt − y
F
t ,w h e r ey
F is the
output under ﬂexible prices.
mct = χ(ν + σ)xt +
1








24For example, for the U.S. is estimated that oil share is in the order of 2%. However, it is estimated a
elasticity of substitution of 0.56, which gives, assuming Q = W/P = MC, α
F =( 0 .02)
0.56 = 11%. This share
would be even higher if we consider a high steady state value of oil,Q.
13case when ψ =1 , the Cobb-Douglas production function, the importance of oil is diminished
since the ampliﬁer eﬀect of ψ is neglected 25.
Similarly, we approximate up to second order the aggregate demand and the monetary
policy rule. The details can be found in appendix B. In the next sub-section we work on a
tractable version of the model summarized in two equations on πt and yt.
4.3 Determinants of the Level of Inﬂation Premium
After combining the corresponding equations for the marginal costs, the policy rule, and the
auxiliary variables vt and zt, the model can be written as a system of two second order equations
on inﬂation and output:






























where parameters κy,κ q,Ωmc,Ωπ,ωπ,ωy are deﬁned in the appendix B.
The parameters {Ωmc,Ωπ,ωπ,ωy} are the sources of the level of inﬂation premium and
capture the interaction of nonlinearities of the model and volatility of oil price shocks. Note
that if the aforementioned parameters were equal to zero the model collapses to a standard
version of a New Keynesian model in log linear form.
The ﬁrst parameter Ωmc accounts for the convexity of marginal costs with respect to oil
prices and depends, crucually, on the elasticity of substitution ψ. In order to illustrate this
















Notice that when ψ<1(ψ>1), the second derivative of equation (34 ) with respect to oil,
given by αF ¡
1 − αF¢
(1 − ψ), is positive (negative) and therefore the marginal cost function
is convex (concave) with respect to oil prices. Thus, the parameter Ωmc is positive (negative),
and everything else equal, a positive (negative) inﬂation premium should be observed. The
case when ψ<1 captures the fact that when oil is diﬃcult to substitute, an increase in the oil
price triggers a more than proportional increase in marginal costs. Hence, when the marginal
cost is convex in oil prices, the volatility of shocks induce forward looking ﬁrms to charge
optimally higher prices. In Figure 2, in order to ilustrate the previous mechanism, we plot the
relation between the level of inﬂation premium and the parameter ψ:
25Since oil has few substitutes an appealing functional form to capture this feature is the CES production
function. This function oﬀers ﬂexibility in the calibration of the degree of substitution between oil and labor.
Some authors that have included oil in the analysis of RBC models and monetary policy, have omitted this
feature. For example, Kim and Loungani (1992) calibrate a production function for the U.S. that is Cobb-
Douglas between labor and a composite of capital and energy, and they found that the impact of oil in the RBC
for the U.S. economy is small given that oil has a small share on output. However, we argue that considering










Figure 2: Level of Inﬂation Premium and ψ
The parameter Ωπ accounts for the convexity of the Phillips curve with respect to output.
More precisely, when this parameter is positive, inﬂation is convex with respect to output and
it follows that higher volatility on output, generated by oil price shocks, delivers a positive
premium in inﬂation. As it is shown in appendix B, a necessary condition for the convexity of








+ τν >(2 − τ)σ (35)







tends to be positive, a suﬃcient condi-
tion for the convexity of the Phillips curve is v−σ suﬃciently large since τ<126. Then in our
model the convexity of the Phillips curve comes from the convexity of real wages with respect
to output. Our assumption on consumption and leisure preferences imply that households tend
to value more leisure as their income increases, making their labor supply less elastic. In this
case, changes in real wages would generate lower increases in labor supply since the income
eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect generated by the change in real wages27.
The parameter ωπ captures the direct eﬀect of volatility on future expected inﬂation, which
is positive for any parametrization (ωπ > 0). Finally, ωy, is negative and accounts for the
standard precautionary savings eﬀect.
The previous four parameters interact in general equilibrium to determine the overall level
of inﬂation premium. The analytical solution obtained by the perturbation method implies




















bo + b2 =









¤ κ(Ωπ + Ωmc)
∆2
> 0 (37)
and ∆2,∆0 > 028.I f bo + b2 > 0 the model will deliver a positive premium. Notice that in
order to warranty b2 > 0 we need the phillips curve to be convex Ωπ > 0 and the elasticity of
substitution between labor an oil to be less than one, which implies that Ωmc > 0. Then, it
follows from expression (36) that in order to obtain a positive level of inﬂation premium the
following condition must hold:
φy (b2 + ωπ) > −σκy (a2 + ωy) (38)
where a2,and ωy < 0.29
Furthermore, from equation (38) a necessary condition for a positive inﬂation premium
(Eπ > 0)i sφy > 0. Hence, even so there exist several sources to generate the inﬂation
premium, in general equilibrium, the policy of the central bank is key to determine the way
in which uncertainty is distributed between output and inﬂation premiums. Notice that the
larger φy the larger the level of inﬂation premium. Thus a central bank that cares only about
inﬂation, in equilibrium, it would not generate a positive inﬂationary premium, instead all
the uncertainty in the economy will be observed by a negative premium in output (reduction
in output). In ﬁgure 3, we depict the relation between the level of inﬂation premium an the
parameter φy.
28We deﬁne





σ (1 − ρ)
2 + φy

∆0 =( φπ − 1)κ1 +( 1− β)φy
then, ∆0,∆2 > 0 to the extent that φπ > 1, which it is interpreted as an active monetary policy rule.




















Figure 3: Level Inﬂation Premium and φy
Remarkably, the existence of these inﬂation and output premiums depend crucially on
the existence of a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output. When the central bank does not
face this trade-oﬀ,i ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l et oﬁnd a policy rule where the inﬂation premium in
inﬂation is zero. The previous implication steams from the fact that the second order solution
depends upon the log-linear one30. Therefore, in order to observe a positive inﬂation premium
a necessary condition is the existence of an endogenous trade-oﬀ for the central bank. In section
6 we show how oil price shocks generate an endogenous trade-oﬀ which can make optimal for
a central bank to have a positive inﬂation premium in equilibrium.
5S o m e N u m e r i c a l E x p e r i m e n t s
In this section we explore the ability of the model to generate changes in the level of premium
in the main variables of the model, in particular, in inﬂation. We use the Schimitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004) code which provides second order numerical solutions to a non-linear system.
5.1 Calibration
To calibrate the model we choose standard parameter values in the literature. We set a quar-
terly discount factor, β,e q u a lt o0.99 which implies an annualized rate of interest of 4%.F o r
the coeﬃcient of risk aversion parameter, σ,w ec h o o s eav a l u eo f2 and the inverse of the
elasticity of labour supply, v,is calibrated to be equal to 3, similar to those used in the RBC
literature and consistent with the micro evidence. We choose a degree of monopolistic compe-
tition, ε,e q u a lt o7.66. which implies a ﬁrm mark-up of 15%. The elasticity of substitution
between oil and labor, ψ, is set equal to 0.59 as suggested by Kim and Loungani (1992) and
30In a log-linear solution, when the central bank does not face a meaningful trade-oﬀ between stabilizing
inﬂation and output, the optimal policy implies both zero inﬂation and output gap.
17we set α =0 .028 so that the share of oil prices in the marginal cost is around 13%31. The
probabilities of the Calvo lotteries is set equal to 0.66 which implies that the ﬁrms adjust prices
every four quarters. To be consistent with our analytical solution we used a standard active
t a y l o r - t y p er u l ea n dw es e tφπ =1 .5 and φy =0 .532. Finally, the log of real oil price follows an
AR(1) stochastic process with ρq =0 .95 and standard deviation, σε =0 .14 for the ﬁrst sample
and ρq =0 .82 and standard deviation, σε =0 .12 for the second one. These processes imply
standard deviations for real oil prices of 0.57 and 0.20 in each sample, respectively.
5.2 Explaining the U.S. Level of Inﬂation Premium with Oil Price Shocks
To clarify, the simulations that follow are a ﬁrst step at exploring whether the mechanisms we
have just emphasized have potential for explaining the level inﬂation-premium. We interpret oil
as the main driven force of the level of inﬂation premium, although we are aware that in order
to closely match the moments of other macro variables, additional shocks might be necessary.
Thus, we intend to confront the data in line with the mechanism previously described. We do
so by generating the unconditional mean of inﬂation implied by the calibrated model for the
pre and post Volcker periods. The only diﬀerence in the calibration between these two periods
is the assumption on the data generating process of oil. We ﬁt an AR(1) process for oil prices
in each period and ﬁnd that both the persistence and the variance of oil price shocks have
fallen from the ﬁrst to the second period.
The key result is that we are able to generate a positive level of inﬂation premium which
allows the model to mimic the average inﬂation level in the US in the pre-Volcker and post
Volcker periods without relying on diﬀerent monetary policy regimes across periods as it was
suggested by CGG.
In this section we evaluate how the model does at capturing the conditional mean in the
key macro variables, and in particular in inﬂation. In Table 2 we report the means of inﬂation,
output gap and nominal interest rates for the two previously deﬁned periods
Table 2: Unconditional Moments Generated by the Benchmark Model
Pre and Volcker Post Volcker
Simulated Observed Simulated Observed
π 1.29 1.38 0.26 0.53
y −1.30 −0.36 −0.27 −0.22
R 1.28 1.91 0.26 1.34
σq 0.57 0.57 0.20 0.20
We compare the simulated benchmark economy with the observed data. The key result to
highlight, is that the model can match very closely the mean of both inﬂation and output for
the two sub-periods. Thus, inﬂation mean during the ﬁrst period is 1.38% while the model
31Leduc and Sill (2004) have assumed a higher share of oil in the production function (0.34).
32Importantly, we have used the same taylor type rule for the overall sample. Values φπ > 1 and φy > 0 are
consistent with recent estimation using bayesian methods by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005). Although the
previous authors ﬁnd out by using a shorter sample, from 1982 on, that both parameters are estimated to be
higher with respect to the overall sample.
18delivers a value of 1.29%. Similarly, for the second period we observe a mean inﬂation of 0.53%
and the model predicts a value of 0.26%. The model is much less successful in matching the
moments of the nominal interest rate and to a less extent of output. This might reﬂect the
importance of productivity and demand shocks to account for the dynamics of these other
variables.
To check the robustness of our results we calculate the moments under two extensions.
First, we consider real rigidities in the line of BG (2005)33 to account for a smooth adjustment
of marginal costs. Second, we introduce demand shocks. The results are reported in the table
3, and show that our conclusions do not change much even when these additional features are
taken into account.
Table 3: Unconditional Moments Generated by Alternative Models
Pre and Volcker Post Volcker
Real rigidities Demand shocks Real rigidities Demand shocks
π 1.29 1.27 0.26 0.24
y −1.34 −1.34 −0.29 −0.28
R 1.32 1.23 0.26 0.22
Finally, we used a simple counterfactual exercise in order to factor the eﬀect of the level
of inﬂation premium. We use the policy functions derived in the previous section for inﬂation
to simulate the inﬂation paths by ﬁtting the historical sequence of oil price shocks into the
previously discussed policy functions. The sequence of oil prices is obtained as the residuals of
an AR(1) model for the period 1970q1 to 2000q434:
qt =0 .96
(39.0)
qt−1 +0 .13 t (39)
The simulate series of inﬂation using the second and ﬁrst order approximated solutions and the
actual inﬂation series are plotted in ﬁgure 4. All series are expressed in annual rates. As it can
be notice, the second order solution of the model can track pretty well the historical evolution
of inﬂation. In particular, it can account for the sharp increase in inﬂation during the 70s
and the persistent high inﬂation levels observed afterwards. The picture also explains why a
linear approximated solution of the model might lead to conclude that oil price shocks can not
explain the observed pattern in inﬂation during the 70s. The linear solution by eliminating
any inﬂation premium component constantly underpredicts the mean level of inﬂation.










t . See Felices (2005) and Rabanal (2004) for two diﬀerent forms of micro-
formalizations of real wage rigidities. We set γ =0 .5 for the simulations.
34We are aware that there are some non-linearities in oil prices, but in order to keep simple the analysis we
have omitted any non-linear behavior in the data generating process of oil prices.










Figure 4: Simulated Inﬂation Paths for the US
Moreover, it is striking how the model can not only account for the behavior of inﬂation
during the 70s, but also during second half of the 80s and the 90s, specially if we consider that
our model uses only oil shocks to simulate the series. Thus, the impact of oil prices shocks
does not depend on the change in the feedback monetary policy rules as it is suggested by
CGG. Our results show that in the context of our model a supply shock can indeed induce
higher levels of inﬂations under both periods. Therefore, contrary with CGG ﬁndings, the
accommodative or passive reaction of the monetary policy must not be considered as a critical
factor in the 1970´s period.
The only period where the simulated path of inﬂation and the observed one diﬀers from
each other is during the Volcker administration. During this period it seems more likely that
negative monetary policy shocks were also in place in addition to the oil price shocks. Thus,
our ﬁndings suggest that in order to match the data during the Volcker period, it is required
a strong negative demand shock to compensate the high expected levels of inﬂation generated
by oil price shocks.
The main argument of CGG to disqualify high oil prices as an explanation for persistent
high levels of inﬂation during the 70s was that oil price shocks are only capable of producing
one time increase on the price level but not persistent higher inﬂation levels. However, this
intuition is only true in a world where uncertainty does not matter. Theoretically, as the
previous section shows, when uncertainty is high and the model exhibits no linearities, a ﬁrst
order approximation to the rational expectations solution is very inaccurate since it omits the
eﬀects of inﬂation premium in the equilibrium dynamics. Inﬂation premium emerges in general
equilibrium usually from the concavity of both the utility and the production functions. As
we have shown in the section 3, with a CES production function, expected marginal costs are
increasing on the volatility of wages and oil prices since the marginal cost is a convex function
of both wages and oil prices. Higher expected marginal costs induce ﬁrms to set higher prices
in a world where ﬁrms are forward looking.
20In order to check the robustness of our results for our assumption of the monetary policy
reaction function, we simulate the path of the short term interest rate using the same model
and sequence of oil price shocks used previously. We want to show that our result does not
depend critically on this assumption. In contrast with CGG and others who consider policy
reaction functions that generate indeterminacy of the equilibrium for the pre-volcker period,
instead we assume an active policy rule that guarantees determinacy. Moreover, our implied
policy function is able to generate a sequence of nominal interest rates that match closely
the observed one during the 70s. For the rest of the sample, the simulated interest rate
systematically underpredicts the observed one. This might reﬂect the fact that in order to
match the nominal interest rate additional sources of shocks are needed.












Figure 5: Simulated Nominal Interest Rate for US
As the previous pictures show the simulated inﬂation and interest rate paths follows closely
the observed ones for the USA. In table 4 we provide further evidence of the ability of the model
to capture de properties of the data showing that the means of the simulated series for inﬂation,
output gap and interest rate matches closely their analogs for US data.
Table 5: Conditional Moments Generated by the Benchmark Model
Pre and Volcker Post Volcker
Simulate Observed Simulated Observed
π 1.34 1.38 0.67 0.53
y −0.85 −0.36 −0.44 −0.22
R 1.33 1.90 .651 1.3
216 Oil prices and Endogenous Trade-oﬀ
As BG (2005) pointed out the lack of meaningful trade-oﬀ between stabilization of inﬂation
and the output gap is one of the drawbacks of standard New Keynesian models. Thus, the
problem faced by the central bank becomes trivial, since full inﬂation stabilization becomes
optimal regardless its cost in terms of output gap losses. This implication, denominated as
the "divine coincidence" by BG, implies as well that no inﬂationary and output premiums are
present35.
Fortunately, in contrast to a standard NK models and BG (2005) speciﬁcation, our bench-
mark model exhibits an endogenous trade-oﬀ generated by oil price shocks without relying
on real rigidities. As it is shown in the appendix C, our economy can be written in terms of
inﬂation and deviation of output with respect to its eﬃcient level as follows:



















xt = yt − yE
t and yE
t corresponds to the log deviations of the eﬃcient level of output. The
parameters αE and αF account for the share of oil prices on the marginal cost under the
eﬃcient and ﬂexible price levels of output, respectively,
αE = αψ (Q)
1−ψ (42)
αF = αψ (Qµ)
1−ψ (43)
In our model the endogenous trade oﬀ emerges from the combination of a distorted steady
state and a CES production function. When the elasticity of substitution between oil and
labor is equal to one,ψ =1 , the Coob-Douglas case as in BG, the trade oﬀ disappears, hence
the ﬂexible and eﬃcient level of output only diﬀer by a constant term, which in turn implies
that αE = αF. In addition, when monopolistic competition distortion is eliminated, using
a proportional subsidy tax, as in Woodford (2003), the trade-oﬀ is inhibited, since again
αE = αF 36.
The trade-oﬀ in variances in turns will deliver a trade-oﬀ in means. Therefore, in our
model the central bank also faces the dilemma of reducing the mean of inﬂation at the cost of
reducing the average growth rate of the economy. As we have discussed previously, the policy
rule of the central bank allows to split out the costs of high inﬂation and output premiums.
35Remember that the second order solution of the model depends upon the ﬁrst order solution.
36Benigno and Woodford (2005) in a similar model but without oil price shocks have also found an endogenous
trade-oﬀ by combining a distorted steady state with a government expenditure shock. In their framework, is the
combination of a distorted steady state along with a non-linear aggregate budget constraint due to government
expenditure. What is crucial to generate the endogenous trade-oﬀ. Similarly in our paper, is the combination of
the distorted steady state and the non-linearity of the CES production function what delivers the endogenous
trade-oﬀ.
22The existence of this endogenous trade oﬀ implies that is optimal for the central bank to allow
higher levels of inﬂation in response to supply shocks. Thus our results imply that the inﬂation
behavior during the 70s no only might reﬂect a perfectly consistent monetary policy but an
optimal one.
Furthermore, this trade-oﬀ depends, among other things, on the steady state level of oil
prices, Q, and on the elasticity of substitution between oil and labor, ψ.A s e q u a t i o n s (42)
and (43) show, the trade-oﬀ is increasing (decreasing) on ψ,w h e nψ<1 (ψ>1)







This results is particularly interesting since we can argue that during the 70s it was observed
a permanent increase in the mean value of oil prices, which it might explain why the FED
allowed unusual high levels of inﬂation.
We can then use our setup to show this latter point more formally. Let´s consider the
















and the Phillips curve deﬁn e di nt e r m so fe ﬃcient output gap (equation (41)). As CGG (1999)





This type of policy implies a trade oﬀ between inﬂation and output gap since the variance of






This trade-oﬀ allows to generate a policy frontier for the central bank that plots the optimal
levels of the standard deviation of output and inﬂation for diﬀerent values of the preference
parameter  . Notice that since κy depends on the elasticity of substitution of oil and labor,
ψ, the policy frontier changes as this parameter changes. In particular, when the ψ is smaller,
this is when oil and labor are very poor substitutes, the trade-oﬀ that the central bank faces
deteriorates. For each percentage point of inﬂation the central bank has to increase by more
the standard deviation of output.
37For a microfounded welfare function with oil prices and CES production function see Montoro (2005). For
this paper we consider   as preferences parameter that do not depend on the structural parameters of the
model.































Figure 6: Policy Frontier and oil price elasticity of Substitution
247C o n c l u s i o n s
Traditionally New Keynesian log-linear models have been used to match second order moments.
However, they have the limitation that their solution implies certainty equivalence neglecting
any role of uncertainty and volatility over the level of inﬂation. To the extent that uncertainty
is important in real economies, a second order solution of the New Keynesian model is required
to improve their ﬁt of the data. In particular, this type of solution provides a link between
volatility of shocks and the average values of endogenous variables oﬀering a non-conventional
way to analyze business cycles. In this paper we have taken this approach and show how the
interaction between volatility and the convexity of both the marginal costs and the phillips
curve improves the ability of a standard New keynesian model to explain the history of inﬂation
in the USA.
The second order solution allow us to provide an additional element to the explanation
suggested by CGG for the high inﬂation episode during the 70s. Our explanation puts at the
center of the discussion the volatility of supply shocks, in particular oil price shocks. Contrary
to what a linear solution implies, a second order solution establishes the link between volatility
of oil prices and expected inﬂa t i o nw h a tw ec a l l e dinﬂation premium. In the paper we show
that a calibrated version of our model can match very closely the inﬂation behavior observed
in the USA during both the pre-Volcker and post-Volcker periods. In particular we show
that the high volatility of oil price shocks during the 70s implied an endogenous high level of
inﬂation premium that can account for the high average inﬂation levels observed in US during
that period . The analytical solution obtained by implementing the perturbation method
shows that the existence of this inﬂation premium depends crucially on, ﬁrst, the convexity of
both the marginal costs and the Phillips curve and second, on the response of the monetary
authority. The reaction of the central bank determines in equilibrium how higher volatility
generated by oil price shocks is distributed between a higher average inﬂation and lower growth
rate. Moreover, in order to observe a positive inﬂation premium it is required that the central
bank partially reacts to supply shocks.
In addition, a standard result of the New Keynesian models is that they can not generate
an endogenous trade-oﬀ for monetary policy, therefore in those models zero inﬂation and zero
output gap is the optimal response of the Central Bank, consequently zero inﬂation premium
becomes optimal. In this paper, we show that this result, denominated by Blanchard and Gali
as the "Divine Coincidence" holds only under rather special assumptions: when the steady state
coincides with the eﬃcient one (there is no a distorted steady state) or when the production
function has an elasticity of substitution equal to 1. Instead, we show that for the general
case, allowing for a distorted along with a CES production function, oil price shocks are able
to generate an endogenous cost push shock making the central bank problem a meaningful
one.
This endogenous cost push shock generates a trade-oﬀ in means for the central bank. In this
case the central bank can not reduce the average level of inﬂation without sacriﬁcing output
growth. We show that the optimal policy implies to partially accommodate oil price shocks
and to let, on average, a higher level of inﬂation. Furthermore, this trade-oﬀ depends crucially
on the share of oil in the production function, on the elasticity of substitution between oil
and labor and on the average oil prices. Thus our results imply that the inﬂation behavior in
25the U.S. during the 70s not only might reﬂect a perfectly consistent monetary policy but an
optimal one.
Our results can be extended in many directions. First, it will be worth to explore the
eﬀect of openness in inﬂation premium. Second, the analytical perturbation method strategy
proposed in the paper can be used to capture the eﬀects of change in a monetary policy regime
over inﬂation. Finally, it will be worth also to explore the implications of other source of shocks
in the determination in the level of inﬂation premium.
26References
[1] Benigno, Pierpaolo and Michael Woodford (2003), ”Optimal Monetary Policy and Fiscal
Policy”, NBER Macroeconomic Annual 2003, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
[2] Benigno, Pierpaolo and Michael Woodford (2005)" “Inﬂation Stabilization and Welfare:
The Case of a Distorted Steady State”.Journal of the European Economic Association,
3(6): 1-52 .
[3] Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler and Michael Watson (1997), "Systematic Monetary Policy
and the Eﬀects of Oil Price Shocks", Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 91-142.
[4] Blanchard, Olivier and Jordi Gali (2005) " Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian
Model" mimeo Pompeu Fabra University
[5] Calvo, Guillermo (1983), ”Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximizing Framework”. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 12, 383-398.
[6] Castillo, Paul and Carlos Montoro (2005), "Non-homothetic preferences and the asym-
metric eﬀects of monetary policy", mimeo, LSE and Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.
[7] Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler (1999), " The Science of Monetary Policy:
A new Keynesian Perspective". Journal of Economic Literature,pp 1661-1707
[8] Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler (2000), ”Monetary Policy Rules and
Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory”, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
115, pp. 147-80.
[9] Cogley, Timothy. and Thomas. Sargent (2005) "Drifts and Volatilities: Monetary Policies
a n dO u t c o m e si nt h eP o s tW W I IU . S . " ,Review of Economic Dynamics, 8,262-302
[10] Evans, Martin and Viktoria Hnatkovska(2005) "Solving General Equilibrium Models with
Incomplete Markets and Many Assets"NBER Technical Working Paper No. 318
[11] De Paoli, Bianca (2004) "Monetary Policy and Welfare in a Small Open Economy", CEP
Discussion Paper N ◦639
[12] Felices, Guillermo (2005), "Can Information-Consistent Wages Help Explain the Dynamics
of Real Wages and Inﬂation?", mimeo, BoE.
[13] Ferrero, Andrea (2005), " Fiscal and Monetary Policy Rules for a Currency Union", ECB
working paper series, #502
[14] Gambetti, Luca , Fabio Canova and Evi Pappa (2005) "The Structural dynamics of US
output and inﬂation: What explains the Changes?.mimeo Pompeu Fabra University.
[15] Gordon, Robert (2005) "What caused the decline in U.S. business cycle volatility ?."
NBER Working paper 11777.
27[16] Hamilton, James (2003), "What is an oil Shock?" Journal of Econometrics 36, pp. 265-286
[17] Hamilton, James and Ana Herrera (2004), "Oil Shocks and Aggregate Macroeconomic
Behavior: The Role of Monetary Policy", Journal of Money Credit and Banking 36, pp.
265-286
[18] Jin, H-H and Keneth Judd (2002), " Perturbation Methods for Rational Expectations
Models". Mimeo Standford University
[19] Judd, Kenneth (1998), "Numerical Methods in Economics", MIT, press, Cambridge MA.
[20] In-Moo Kim and Prakash Loungani (1992)" The role of energy in real business cycle
models". Journal of Monetary Economics 20 173-189.
[21] Leduc, Sylvian and Keith Sill (2004), "A Quantitative Analysis of Oil-price Shocks, Sys-
tematic Monetary Policy, and Economic Downturns", Journal of Monetary Economics 51
pp. 781-808.
[22] Leeper, Erick and Tao Zha (2003)" Modest Policy Interventions" Journal of Monetary
Economics, 50(8),1673-1700
[23] Lubik Thomas and Frank Schorfheide (2004), " Testing for Indeterminancy: an Applica-
tion to US Monetary Policy", American Economic Review, 94,190-217
[24] Montoro, Carlos (2005) "Oil Shocks and Optimal monetary Policy". mimeo.
[25] Orphanides, Athanasios (2001), "Monetary Policy Rules, Macroeconomic Stability, and
Inﬂation: A View from the Trenches", Discussion paper, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
[26] Primacieri, Giorgio (2004) " Time Varying Structural Var and Monetary Policy" Forth-
coming, Review of Economic Studies
[27] Rabanal, Pau (2004), "Real Wage Rigidities, Endogenous Persistence, and Optimal Mon-
etary Policy", mimeo.
[28] Rabanal, Pau and Juan Rubio-Ramirez (2005) "Comparing New Keynessian Models of
the Business Cycles: A Bayesian Approach", Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 52,
No. 6, pp.1151-1166
[29] Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie and Martin Uribe (2004). ”Solving dynamic general equilibrium
models using a second-order approximation to the policy function, Journal of Economic
Dynamics.and Control 28, 755-775..
[30] Sims, Christopher and Tao Zha (2005), "Were there Regime Sitches in US Monetary
Policy?", forthcoming in the American Economic Review.
[31] Weise, Charles (1999) " The Asymmetric Eﬀects of Monetary Policy: A nonlinear Vector
Autor-pregresive Approach". Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 31, N◦,p 8 5 -
p108.
28AE q u a t i o n s o f t h e M o d e l
A.1 The system of equations
Using the the market clearing conditions that close the model, the dynamic equilibrium of the
model described in section 2 is given by the following set of 8 equations:
θ(Πt)






Nt = µY 1−σ
t MCt + θβEt [(Πt+1)
ε Nt+1] (49)













































The ﬁrst three equations represent the Phillips curve, which has been written recursively using
the auxiliary variables Nt and Dt. The aggregate demand block is represented by the IS and
the taylor rule. the last three equations describe the labor market equilibrium. We use this set
of eight non-linear equations to obtaint numerically the second order solution of the model.
A.2 The deterministic steady state
The non-stochastic steady state of the endogenous variables is given by:
Inﬂation Π =1
Auxiliary variables N = D = Y/(1 − θβ)
Interest rate R = β−1
Marginal costs MC =1 /µ




1 − αF¢ 1
1−ψ





























αF is the share of oil in the marginal costs, τw and τy and τl are constants38.N o t i c e t h a t
the steady state values of real wages, output and labor depend on the steady state ratio
of oil prices with respect to the marginal cost. This implies that permanent changes in oil
prices would generate changes in the steady state of this variables. Also, as the standard
new-keynesian models, the marginal cost in steady state is equal to the inverse of the mark-
up (MC =1 /µ =( ε − 1)/ε). Since monopolistic competition aﬀects the steady state of the
model, ouput in steady state is below the eﬃcient level (i.e. when MC =1 ). We call to this
feature a distorted steady state.
A.3 The ﬂexible price equilibrium
The ﬂexible price equilibrium of the endogenous variables is consistent with zero inﬂation in
every period (i.e. .ΠF
t =1 ). In this case marginal costs are constant, equal to its steady state

















































Notice that the ﬂexible price equilibrium is not eﬃcient, since there are distortions from mo-























30A.4 The eﬃcient price equilibrium
The eﬃcient price equilibrium of the endogenous variables is consistent with zero inﬂation in








































Where: αE = αψ ¡
Q
¢1−ψ <α F is the share of oil in the marginal costs when the monopolistic
distortions are eliminated. Notice that the eﬃcient equilibrium of wages, output and labor
diﬀers from the ﬂexible price equilibrium only through αE.
A.5 The linear system
The model economy up to a linear approximation is represented by the following system of six
equations:







































Equation(56) is the Phillips curve, the aggregate demand is represented by the IS (57) and the
taylor rule (58), and the last three equations describe the labor market equilibrium.
31B The second order approximation of the system
B.1 The AS equation
The Phillips curve with oil prices is given by the following three equations:
θ(Πt)






Nt = µY 1−σ
t MCt + θβEt (Πt+1)
ε Nt+1 (63)
Dt = Y 1−σ
t + θβEt (Πt+1)
ε−1 Dt+1 (64)
B.1.1 The ﬁrst order approximation of the Phillips Curve






















To obtain the standard New-Keynesian Phillips Curve we need to solve for nt−dt as a function
of the real marginal costs and expected inﬂation. We substract equations (66) and (67):
















Replace equation (69) in (68) and we obtain nt − dt as a function of the real marginal costs
and expected inﬂation:









Replacing equation (70)in (62), we obtain:








θ (1 − θβ). This is the standard Phillips curve, inﬂation depends linearly on the
real marginal costs and expected inﬂation.
32B.1.2 The second order approximation of the Phillips Curve
Similarly to the previous subsection, we follow same steps as Benigno and Woodford (2005) to




































































W h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned the auxiliary variables at,bt+1,ct and et+1 as:
at =( 1− σ)yt + mct bt+1 = επt+1 + nt+1
ct =( 1− σ)yt et+1 =( ε − 1)πt+1 + dt+1
Substract equations (73) and (74a), and using the fact that X2 − Y 2 =( X − Y )(X + Y ),f o r
any two variables X and Y :
nt − dt =( 1 − θβ)(at − ct)+
1
2
(1 − θβ)(at − ct)(at + ct) (75)
+θβEt (bt+1 − et+1)+
1
2









Plugging in the values of at, bt+1, ct and et+1 into equation (75),w eo b t a i n(89)
nt − dt =( 1 − θβ)mct +
1
2
(1 − θβ)mct (2(1 − σ)yt + mct) (76)
+θβEt (πt+1 + nt+1 − dt+1)+
1
2









Taking forward one period equation (72), we can solve for nt+1 − dt+1:

















replace equation (77) in (76) and make use of the auxiliary variable nt + dt =( 1− θβ)zt
nt − dt =( 1 − θβ)mct +
1
2

























33Notice that we use only the linear part of equation (77) when we replace nt+1 − dt+1 in
the quadratic terms. Similarly, we make use of the linear part of equation (72) to replace
(nt − dt)= θ
1−θπt in the right hand side of equation (78).
Replace equation (78) in (72):
πt = κmct +
1
2































θ (1 − θβ) as deﬁned previously.
Deﬁne the following auxiliary variable:












(1 − θβ)πtzt (80)
where zt =( nt + dt)/(1 − θβ) has the following linear expansion:












Using the deﬁnition for vt,e q u a t i o n(79)can be expressed as:
vt = κmct +
1
2










which is equation (29) in the main text.
B.2 The MC equation and the labor market equilibrium






































wt = νlt + σyt (87)
34lt = yt − ψ(wt − mct)+b ∆t (88)
Where wt and b ∆t are, respectively, the log of the deviation of the real wage and the price
dispersion measure from their respective steady state. Notice that equations (87)and (88) are
not approximations, but exact expresions.





(ν + σ)yt + νψmct + vb ∆t
i
(89)
Plugging the real wage in equation (86) and simplifying:

















.This is the equation (31) in the main text. This expression
is the second order expansion of the real marginal cost as a function of output and the oil
prices.
B.3 The price dispersion measure









Since a proportion 1−θ of intermediate ﬁrms set prices optimally, whereas the other θ set the
price last period, this price dispersion measure can be written as:














Dividing and multiplying by (Pt−1)
−ε the last term of the RHS:


















t (z)/Pt = Nt/Dt and Pt/Pt−1 = Πt, using equation (8) in the text and the deﬁnition
for the dispersion measure lagged on period, this can be expressed as








Which is a recursive representation of ∆t as a function of ∆t−1 and Πt.
We can show that a second order approximation of the price dispersion depends solely on
second order terms on inﬂation. Take the second order taylor expansion to equation (91):
b ∆t = −ε
Z 1
0






(pt (z) − pt)


















(pt (z) − pt)













(pt (z) − pt)






From this expression we can see that the price dispersion measure is function only of second
order terms. Using the fact that a proportion 1−θ of individuals set prices optimally whereas












(pt−1 (z) − pt)
























Where we have used the linear expansion of equation (17) in the text. Similarly, the second













[(pt−1 (z) − pt−1)+( pt−1 − pt)]
2 dz (100)










w h e r ew eh a v em a d eu s eo ft h ee q u a t i o n(97) lagged one period for the deﬁnition of b ∆t−1,
the linear expansion of equations (17) and (8). Considering both terms, we obtain the second
order approximation of ∆t is:













M o r e o v e r ,w ec a nu s ee q u a t i o n(102) to write the inﬁnite sum:
∞ X
t=to
βt−to b ∆t = θ
∞ X
t=to




































Dividing by (1 − βθ) and using the deﬁnition of κ :
∞ X
t=to



















The discounted inﬁnite sum of b ∆t is equal to the sum of two terms, on the initial price dispersion
and the discounted inﬁnite sum of π2
t.
36B.4 The IS and the taylor rule


















which have the following a second order expansion:
yt = Etyt+1 −
1
σ
















rt = φπEtπt+1 + φyyt (108)
Replacing the linear solution of yt inside the quadratic part of equation (108):
yt = Etyt+1 −
1
σ




























¢¤2 is the variance of yt+1 + 1
σπt+1.
B.5 The system in two equations
B.5.1 The AS
Replace the equation for the marginal costs (90) in the second order expansion of the Phillips
curve (109)



























2 (1 − θβ)πtzt
The linear coeﬃcients are given by
κy = κχ(σ + ν)
κq = κ(1 − χ)










37We have separated the coeﬃcientes from the source of the non-linearity, from the price setting
(π)o rt h em a r g i n a lc o s t s( mc), which are the following:
cπ
yy = χ(σ + ν)[2(1− σ)+χ(σ + ν)] cmc




yq =( 1− χ)[2(1− σ)+χ(σ + ν)] cmc




qq =( 1− χ)
2 cmc
qq =( 1− ψ)
χ2(1−χ)
1−αF
Equation (110) is a recursive second order representation of the Phillips curve. However, we
need to express the price dispersion in terms of inﬂation in order to have a the Phillips curve
only as a function of output, inﬂation and the oil price shock. Equation (110) can also be



















































W h i c hc a nb ee x p r e s s e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gr e c u r s i v ew a y :






















This is the second order expression of the Phillips curve as a function solely of ouput, inﬂation
and the initial price distortion, which without any loss of the generality it can be assumed
equal to zero for the analysis (i.e. b ∆to−1 =0 ).
Convexity of the AS The convexity/concavity of πt with respect to yt in equation (110)






































Since the denominator is positive, the covexity condition is:
κχ(σ + ν)
∙























+ τν >(2 − τ)σ (114)






and κy = κχ(σ + ν) is the slope of the Phillips curve with
respect to output. In the case of a closed economy without oil in the production function (i.e.














tend to be positive. A suﬃcient condition (but
not necessary) for convexity of the Phillips curve in the case without oil is that: v>σ .
The AS premium components Equation (110) can be written in the following form:












































yq ytqt + cmc
qq q2
t (118)
Equation (117) and (118) describe the inﬂation premium components coming from the price
setting and the non-linear marginal costs, respectively. In equation (117) we have separated the
components in those coming from the variance of the oil price (ωπ) and from those comming
from the level (Ωπ). The inﬂation premium component from the marginal costs is aﬀected only
for the level, but not for the variance of the shocks.
In order to solve for ωπ,Ωπ and Ωmc we can use the linear solution for output, inﬂation
and the auxiliary variable zt
39















Additionally, we have the transition process for the oil price:








39qt = ρqt−1 + ησqet
where e˜iid(0,1) andη =
p
1 − ρ2









1 +( 1− θβ)b1c1
¸
= βb2





























yq a1 + cmc
qq =( 1− ψ)
χ2 (1 − χ)
1 − αF [(σ + ν)a1 − q]
2 > 0
From simple observation of the coeﬃcients, we can see that ωπ is positive and Ωmc is positive
when the elasticity of substitution between factors is lower than one (i.e. ψ<1),w h e r e a sΩπ
can be either positive or negative.
B.5.2 The aggregate demand
Replace the policy rule (108) in the second order expansion of the IS (109). :



























This can be expressed as:































Similar to the previous sub-section, the IS risk premium can be written as a function of the









Note that the risk premium component of the IS is negative, capturing precautionary savings
due to output and inﬂation volatility.
40B.5.3 The perturbation method


































denotes terms on q and σq of order equal or higher than 3. We express the dynamics of the oil
price as:
qt = ρqt−1 + ησqet (125)
where the oil shock has been normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one, i.e.
e˜iid(0,1).Also, we set η =
p
1 − ρ2 in order to express V (qt)=σ2
q.
In order to solve for the 6 unknown coeﬃcients, we use the following algorithm that consist
in solving recursively for three systems of two equations. This allow us to obtain algebraic
solutions for the unknown coeﬃcients. We follow the following steps:
1. We replace the closed forms of the policy functions (124) and the transition equation for
the shock (125) in the equations for the AS (116) and the AD (121).
2. Solve for a1 and b1: we take the partial derivatives with respect to qt to the two
equations of step 1, then we proceed to evaluate them in the non-stochastic steady state
(i.e. when qt =0and σq =0 ). Then, the only unknowns left are a1 and b1 for two
equations. We proceed to solve for a1 and b1 as function of the deep parameters of the
model.
3. Solve for a2 and b2: similar to step 2, we take succesive partial derivatives with respect
to qt and qt to the two equations of step 1 and we evaluate them at the non-stochastic
steady state. Then, we solve for the unknowns a2 and b2.
4. Solve for a0 and b0: similar to steps 2 and 3, we take succesive partial derivatives
with respect to σq and σq t ot h et w oe q u a t i o n so fs t e p1a n dw ee v a l u a t et h e ma tt h e
non-stochastic steady state. Then, we solve for the unknowns a0 and b0. The solution
for the coeﬃcients is given by:
ao = −(φπ − 1)[(b2 + ωπ) − σ(1 − β)(a2 + ωy)] 1
∆0 bo = −b2 +
£
φy (b2 + ωπ)+σκy (a2 + ωy)
¤ 1
∆0
a1 = −[(φπ − 1)ρ]κq
1
∆1 < 0 b1 =
£








κ(Ωπ + Ωmc) 1







κ(Ωπ + Ωmc) 1
∆2 > 0
w h e r ew eh a v ed e ﬁned the following auxiliary variables:
∆0 =( φπ − 1)κ1 +( 1− β)φy










where ∆0, ∆1,a n d∆2 are all positive.
41C Endogenous Trade-oﬀ






1+υψαF yt + αF (1 + vψ)






This equation can be also written in terms of parameters κy and κq, deﬁn e dp r e v i o u s l yi nt h e













Under ﬂexible prices, mct =0 . Condition that deﬁnes the natural level of output in terms of











Notice that in this economy the ﬂexible price level of output does not coincide with the eﬃcient
one since the steady state is distorted by monopolistic competition The eﬃcient level of output
is deﬁned as the level of output with ﬂexible prices under perfect competition, we use equation
















Where αE = αψ ¡
Q
¢1−ψ . This parameter can be also expressed in terms of the participation
of oil under ﬂexible prices as follows:
αE = αFµψ−1




Using the deﬁnition of eﬃcient level of output, we can write the marginal costs equation


































Using equations (C.5) and (56), the Phillips curve can be written as follows:






This equation corresponds to equation (41) in the main text. We can further write µt in terms









42The dynamic IS equation can also be written in terms of the eﬃcient output gap.





















w h i c hi nt u r nc a nb ew r i t t e na sf o l l o w s :
rE













Notice that when there is no monopolistic distortion or when ψ =1we have that αE = αF,
which implies that there is no an endogenous trade oﬀ.
µt =0∀t
43